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Abstract—The growing number and nature of Internet of
Things (IoT) devices makes these resource-constrained appli-
ances particularly vulnerable and increasingly impactful in their
exploitation. Current estimates for the number of connected
“things” commonly reach the tens of billions. The low-cost and
limited computational strength of these devices can preclude
security features. Additionally, economic forces and a lack of
industry expertise in security often contribute to a rush to market
with minimal consideration for security implications.
It is essential that users of these emerging technologies, from
consumers to IT professionals, be able to establish and retain
trust in the multitude of diverse and pervasive compute devices
that are ever more responsible for our critical infrastructure
and personal information. Remote attestation is a well-known
technique for building such trust between devices. In standard
implementations, a potentially untrustworthy prover attests, using
public key infrastructure, to a verifier about its configuration or
properties of its current state.
Attestation is often performed on an ad hoc basis with
little concern for historicity. However, controls and sensors
manufactured for the Industrial IoT (IIoT) may be expected
to operate for decades. Even in the consumer market, so-called
“smart” things can be expected to outlive their manufacturers.
This longevity combined with limited software or firmware
patching creates an ideal environment for long-lived zero-day
vulnerabilities. Knowing both if a device is vulnerable and if
so when it became vulnerable is a management nightmare as
IoT deployments scale. For network connected machines, with
access to sensitive information and real-world physical controls,
maintaining some sense of a device’s lifecycle would be insightful.
In this paper, we propose a novel attestation architecture,
DAN: a distributed attestation network, utilizing blockchain to
store and share device information. We present the design of
this new attestation architecture, and describe a virtualized
simulation, as well as a prototype system chosen to emulate
an IoT deployment with a network of Raspberry Pi, Infineon
TPMs, and a Hyperledger Fabric blockchain. We discuss the
implications and potential challenges of such a network for
various applications such as identity management, intrusion
detection, forensic audits, and regulatory certification.
Index Terms—IoT, Remote Attestation, Blockchain, Security,
Distributed Systems
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I. INTRODUCTION
The growth of computing technology has borne out Moore’s
Law for half a century. Computers and their peripherals have
become smaller, faster, and cheaper to manufacture. Embedded
systems are now ubiquitous and often invisible to us. Their use
cases span across our daily lives including our critical infras-
tructure, industrial controls, automobiles, medical devices, and
consumer applications. By their very nature, these resource-
constrained devices present unique security challenges. For
nearly two decades, security experts have been warning of the
insecurity of many of these devices, e.g., [40], [69].
The Internet of Things (IoT) is the latest incarnation of
the Internet’s evolution. Connecting machines together via the
Internet is not new. However, the relatively recent convergence
of small and powerful embedded systems, cheap networking
hardware, and pervasive network accessibility has led to a new
world of connected “things.” With machine learning and cloud
computing, many of these things are becoming “smart.” By
various estimates there will 20-50 billion devices connected
to the Internet this year [22], [23], [27], and a trillion devices
by 2035 [59].
IoT devices manifest many of the same resource constraints
as prior generations of disconnected embedded systems, such
as low power consumption and stringent availability require-
ments (e.g., sensors, controls, and monitoring devices), limited
hardware support and capabilities (e.g., reduced compute
power and lack of hardware security), and prolonged life
cycles with minimal oversight, management, or patching.
The economics of design and manufacturing often dictate
these limitations. Unfortunately, the IoT has also inherited a
plethora of security vulnerabilities from hardware, firmware,
and software, as well as those generally associated with
networked and Internet-enabled devices. A rush to market and
a lack of security expertise and awareness by device vendors
means that many devices are built and deployed with known
vulnerabilities and minimal, if any, infrastructure for ongoing
maintenance and support [31]. The always-on, inconspicuous,
and noninteractive nature of the IoT, combined with general
systems security failings, has meant that IoT-targetted attacks
are now a legitimate concern [9], [25], [42], [53].
For end-users and IT professionals, building and main-
taining trust in these small, cheap, and naturally vulnerable
IoT systems is essential as they become more pervasive and
imperceptible in our lives, with access to and control over
our critical infrastructure and increasingly personal and private
data. Standards and best practices for IoT security are being
proposed [13], [24], [35], [45], secure hardware does exist [3],
[49], along with secure operating systems [38], [39] and
network protocols [29]. However, vendor buy-in and consumer
awareness are still lagging behind.
Trusted Computing has been a standard in more traditional
computing environments for years. A key tenant in trusted
computing is the expectation of consistent behavior from
compute devices. Attestation is one mechanism for satisfying
such expectations remotely by providing verifiable evidence
tied to a device’s hardware, firmware, or software. The IoT’s
often purpose-built, simple sensors and controls would seem
a perfect application for such concepts.
One of the key economic factors in IoT adoption is the
promise of a multitude of diverse, connected things inter-
acting autonomously to provide services, convenience, and
efficiency at scale. Here we take particular interest in the
potential for heterogeneous networks of devices that may
interact beyond the traditional borders of organizations or
entities. For example, an energy delivery system (EDS) of grid
operators, consumers, and Federal regulators creates, in effect,
a network of coopetition, or cooperative competition. Each
party is required to trust the devices (sensors, controls, and
smart meters) operating within the network; however, security
interests and incentives may be lacking or wholly unaligned.
In this paper, we consider the problems of trust and device
management for such resource-constrained IoT systems. We
propose a Distributed Attestation Network (DAN) that relies
on blockchain technologies to store and distribute device
information. We present a virtualized simulation of a DAN,
and a prototype system of IoT-analogues using a network
of Raspberry Pi, Infineon TPMs, and a Hyperledger Fabric
blockchain. We discuss the implications and potential chal-
lenges of such a network, as well as various applications such
as identity management, intrusion detection, forensic audits,
and regulatory certification.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
Section II reviews attestation and blockchain technologies.
Section III introduces our distributed attestation network.
Section IV discusses our implementation. Section V presents
quantitative and qualitative analysis. Section VI discusses gen-
eral network feasibility. Section VII considers works related.
We present our concluding thoughts in Section VIII.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide relevant background on trusted
computing, specifically attestation, and blockchain technolo-
gies.
A. Trusted Computing
The idea of trust in computer systems is not new [68]. How-
ever, the term Trusted Computing has been promoted by the
Trusted Computing Group (TCG), formerly the Trusted Com-
puting Platform Alliance (TCPA), a consortium of hardware
and software vendors and computer manufacturers interested
in secure and trustworthy computing since the late 1990s.
Unlike its colloquial usage, trust according to the TCG relies
on the expectation of behavior. That is, a computer system
should operate reliably and consistently as intended (i.e.,
according to some specification). Various debates have long
raged over “whose” intentions are to be expected and enforced.
Regardless, trusted computing has found some success in a
wide range of applications.
A key to the TCG’s invocation of trust is the ability
to prove trustworthiness, or otherwise provide evidence of
a system’s state or properties. As such, the TCG created
specifications for a Trusted Platform Module (TPM), a se-
cure cryptoprocessor with protected storage and cryptographic
computational abilities. Using this special hardware, the TCG
also promoted the concept of remote attestation. Attestation is
the process by which the aforementioned evidence is requested
and supplied. While certain definitions are often tied to specific
use-cases, we prefer this more general and flexible definition
of attestation.
In general, a potentially untrusted prover or target device
attests, or provides evidence through certain protocols, to a
remote verifier or appraiser. The evidence may consist of
hashes, checksums, or computational results linked to hard-
ware, firmware, or software configurations or properties of
the prover’s current state. For example, a common application
has been software integrity checks initiated by a challenge-
response protocol and secured using public key infrastructure
(PKI). Immediately, the question arises as to why one would
trust the provided evidence? A standard solution, as proposed
by the TCG, is for the verifier to assume the existence of a
trusted component on the prover. This root of trust or trust
anchor is typically a TPM with various trusted cryptographic
keys and functionality.
The TPM provides a hardware root of trust for attestation.
While typical TPM implementations are small, and relatively
cheap they still represent undesirable overhead for many IoT
vendors, with added cost, space, and power considerations.
Recently, the TCG announced an IoT-centric TPM specifica-
tion that aims to reduce these factors, and ultimately provide
a “tiny TPM... (that) can be integrated directly within the
host chips [66]”. Other proposals seek a more light-weight
solution, with no TPM and minimal hardware capabilities,
such as SMART [21], SANCUS [49], Intel’s TrustLite [41],
and self-protecting modules (SPMs) [62]. All of this attention
on secure, isolated computation has led to the inclusion of
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) in modern processor
designs, like Intel’s SGX [7], [19], [32], [34], [46] and ARM’s
TrustZone [4], [10], [11], [48]. For devices that lack the nec-
essary hardware support, especially legacy devices, there have
been several proposals for software-based attestation [43],
[52], [55]–[57], [60].
Traditionally attestation has been static, with a focus on
measured binaries and disk images [54]. One disadvantage to
2
these techniques is the assumption that a program on disk
or in memory is executing as intended. However, thanks to
ever-present buffer overflows and more recent return-oriented
programming attacks, these assumptions cannot hold. More
recent work has focused on dynamic attestation which seeks
to verify runtime integrity [2], [20], [71].
B. Blockchain
Commonly, attestation is performed in an ad hoc manner.
In response to a challenge, the prover generates and sends
the requested information. Even when attestations are made
periodically, trust decisions, on the part of the verifier, are
usually made based on the most contemporaneous evidence.
However, knowing a device is currently trusted, by all best
evidence, tells one little about its prior states. Given the desired
longevity of IoT devices, historicity is important.
When considering a data storage solution for a heteroge-
neous, multi-organization IoT attestation network, it should be
distributed and decentralized. Given the potential for mutual-
distrust, each member should be party to storing the attested
data. A further requirement is that transactions amongst the
network must be immutable, transparent, and secure. Haber
and Stornetta apprear to be the first to describe a tamper-
resistant process for cryptographically linking distinct data,
in their case timestamps [30], in such a way as to make
future forgeries and retroactive changes infeasible and evident.
In the seminal Bitcoin work, the pseudonymous Nakamoto
introduced a timestamp server that linked items (transactions)
into a cryptographically secure chain of blocks [47]. Driven
by the explosion of popularity of Bitcoin, research into the
underlying technology, this blockchain, soon recognized ap-
plications beyond cryptocurrencies [67].
Blockchain is a cryptographically secure, decentralized dis-
tributed ledger. Distributed amongst a network of computers,
this shared ledger contains synchronized data that is crypto-
graphically signed and hash-chained to create a secure, veri-
fiable audit of all transactions. Blockchains are decentralized
in peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, with each peer maintaining
the replicated ledger. Blockchains may be public or private
(permissioned), with varying degrees of access controls within
the ledger. Blocks contain the synchronized data and may be
created concurrently by peers, creating the potential for frag-
mentation and divergent histories within the chain. Therefore,
block inclusion must be achieved through a consensus protocol
amongst the participating peers, e.g., Bitcoin’s reliance on
proof-of-work.
We chose a Hyperledger Fabric, version 1.4, blockchain
implementation for our proof-of-concept DAN. Hyperledger
is an open source, collaborative project to facilitate and en-
courage cross-industry blockchain technologies [65]. Fabric is
a modular and extensible open source framework for building
and deploying permissioned blockchains [8], [14]. Fabric al-
lows flexible, plug-and-play services for key blockchain func-
tionality, such as membership, cryptography, and consensus.
Additionally, Fabric allows distributed applications written in
general purpose programming languages, such as Go, Java,
and Node.js.
Fabric relies on an execute-order-validate architecture, the
first of its kind. Smart contracts supply application logic
during the execution phase and are executed on peer nodes
within a container environment for isolation. An ordering
service receives endorsed (consensus) transaction outputs and
totally orders them before being broadcasting to peers for
validation. In Fabric, an ordering service may be associated
with multiple blockchains in channels. Peers maintain a local
copy of the ledger as an append-only blockchain.
One of the primary features of DAN is the integration
between attestation and the blockchain. This integration is
achieved through smart contracts, or chaincode in Hyper-
ledger. According to Szabo [63], smart contracts “... combine
protocols with user interfaces to formalize and secure relation-
ships.” In the context of Hyperledger, chaincode defines the
interface to and access controls for the underlying ledger. In
this way, read (query) and write (update) access to channels
is programmatically controlled, with execution isolated in a
secured and separate container from a peer’s endorsement
(consensus) logic. For example, an attestation application
would need to define a priori the structure and access controls
associated with submitting and viewing attestations.
C. IoT Challenges
Attesting all IoT devices is infeasible. The scale alone,
of billions of individual devices, makes the idea impractical.
However, one might consider instead just attesting the devices
within a single deployment. Typical IoT deployments might
be as small as dozens of devices in a “smart home” to tens
of thousands of sensors in industrial settings. Managing these
networks will still be hard given the heterogenous nature of
IoT devices and the fragmentation within the market.
Many IoT devices contain batteries for their operation or
as a backup to external power. Given the relative efficiency of
some of these low-power devices, it is feasible that restarts and
power interruptions may be rare. Consequently, static methods
such as boot or load-time attestation are clearly not enough.
In addition, many IoT devices are envisioned to be long-
running, in a “set it and forget it” manner. This means
firmware and software may operate well beyond their intended
lifespan. Further, the evidence clearly shows that long-lived,
undisclosed, zero-day vulnerabilities are not a myth [16].
Understanding which devices are operating within a net-
work, what software is running on those devices, and how that
software is behaving is critical to IoT security and trust. In fact,
there is growing regulatory constraints on these networks and
devices given their often privileged access to data and control
of our physical world [1], [61].
III. DISTRIBUTED ATTESTATION VIA BLOCKCHAIN
In this section, we define our system and threat model as-
sumptions, detail the architecture of our Distributed Attestation
Network (DAN), and discuss potential use cases.
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Fig. 1. DAN organizational chart featuring two organizations, each with
multiple networked nodes, and a shared blockchain.
A. System Model
We consider a heterogenous network of IoT-like devices that
may be resource-constrained in power consumption, compu-
tational ability, communication frequency and reliability, and
storage capacity. We assume a dense network such that each
network node has multiple immediate neighbors, and all nodes
are free to logically communicate (although this may require
intermediate physical hops, such as in a mesh network).
Additionally, we allow that nodes within this network may
be under the authority and control of diverse, cooperative, but
mutually competitive or distrusting organizations or entities.
Finally, we assume that the devices on the network that will
participate in attestation must have some root of trust or trust
anchor.
Requirements. As described by Coker et al. [17], an ideal
attestation architecture should satisfy five (5) principles: in-
formation should be (1) fresh and (2) comprehensive with
(3) constrained disclosure and (4) semantic explicitness, all
backed by (5) trustworthy mechanisms.
B. Threat Model
The adversary or attacker may be passive or active. We
consider primarily an adversary that may introduce malware
into a (small) fraction of devices over a given time period.
Additionally, the adversary may introduce new devices into the
network environment, and supply malicious inputs to public
interfaces. As is standard in single-prover attestation schemes,
we ignore both denial of service (DoS) and physical attacks
in this work.
C. System Design
Our distributed attestation network is a generic and flexible
attestation architecture. DAN does not specify the attestation
protocols, or define the data and properties of interest, or
limit the actors and relationships involved. We believe DAN
is the first such architecture to utilize blockchain as more
than simple distributed storage, but as a prime actor in an
attestation protocol.
An example organization chart is shown in Figure 1. As
shown, there are two organizations involved in this sample
network. Each organization maintains a number of nodes,
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Fig. 2. Example challenge-response protocol within a DAN. The con-
sumer initiates attestation. The producer submits attested information to the
blockchain. A validator submits validation to the blockchain. The consumer
awaits validation, and finally makes a trust decision.
{n11, n12, n13} for Org1 and {n21, n22, n23} for Org2. Addi-
tionally, each organization maintains a number of peer nodes,
{p1} in Org1 and {p2} in Org2. Peer nodes will be discussed
in more detail below. As mentioned prior, we assume that
nodes within the network are free to communicate amongst
themselves, even across organizations. For example, node n11
might communicate with nodes n13 and n22.
Peer nodes here represent those nodes with access to the
blockchain ledger. A network may have one or many peer
nodes with which a single node can communicate. In the case
of traditional computers, every node in a network might be a
peer; however, given the resource constraints of individual IoT
devices, it may be necessary to offload the blockchain manage-
ment to an intermediate and more powerful node, for example
a gateway or base station. This of course introduces additional
security concerns which we discuss later in Section VI.
A goal of DAN is for the individual nodes within the
network to be attested. This is accomplished by nodes called
producers, submitting attestations into the blockchain. This
may be the result of a challenge-response attestation protocol
involving another node in the network. This approach may
leave the door open for an adversary to submit many chal-
lenges and monopolize the resources of a device via computing
attestations. However, we do not consider DoS attacks in this
work. Alternatively, attestations may simply be submitted to
the blockchain on a periodic and autonomous schedule.
Once attestations are present within the blockchain, other
nodes within the network, so called validators, are able to
evaluate the attested information. The results of such validation
are then included in the blockchain, linking a producer and val-
idator with a timestamped and immutable record of attestation.
The final node type within a DAN are the consumers. Con-
sumer nodes want to interact with producer nodes; however,
there may be (rightfully so) distrust in this transaction. Con-
sumers rely on the validated attestations within the blockchain
to formulate trust decisions about producers. Thus decoupling
the trust relationship between producer and consumer. Figure 2
depicts this simple scenario.
Individual nodes within the network may fulfill a variety of
roles. For example, producer nodes may in fact be validating
nodes for specific neighbors. And indeed, a producer node
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may also be a consumer of other producing nodes. This sort of
network aligns nicely with the envisioned IoT, where devices
may perform multiple tasks which in turn depend upon the
services of other network devices. Consider, for example, the
previously mentioned EDS network comprising grid operators,
consumers, and Federal regulators. Grid operators may man-
age a variety of sensors, controls, and smart meters within
their network. An individual consumer may have a variety
of “smart” things attached to the network, such as meters,
backup generators, and alternative energy production mecha-
nisms. Regulatory officials, while not operating network nodes
themselves, have direct interests in validating and monitoring
compliance of such critical infrastructure. In this scenario, all
parties rely on the proper functioning of the network nodes;
however, consumers are incentivized to use more energy than
they pay for, grid operators are incentivized to “check-off”
compliance boxes with minimal expenditure on overhead and
liability, and regulators are responsible to society-at-large for
enforcing the national security and reliability of the grid.
With a DAN, the devices within the network can be attested
in a semi-public fashion, i.e., to those directly involved in the
network. Grid operators may be context-dependent producers,
consumers, and validators. Service consumers may act as both
producers and consumers. Instead of relying on grid operators
to self-report, or the overhead of manpower to manually
verifying compliant operation of these devices, regulators can
now query the devices themselves. In this case, regulators may
act as validators, having direct knowledge of the hardware,
firmware, or software deployed, or at least the relevant security
properties of interest. Some consumers, additionally, may de-
rive trust from such government oversight; however, building
a more diverse trust portfolio for this example might involve
the inclusion of original equipment manufacturers (OEMs),
distributors, or contractors. In this way, trust relationships can
be chosen and distributed, with ground truth device-dependent
and decentralized.
D. Use Cases
The DAN architecture facilitates a variety of current use
cases, and opens the door to many other potential scenarios.
Authentication and Identity Management. In heterogeneous
IoT networks, device identity is crucial for security. Common
solutions might involve MAC or IP address whitelisting,
behavioural and environmental analysis, or challenge-response
protocols using PKI. More robust methods would rely on a root
of trust, whether hardware-based like TPMs and physically
unclonable functions (PUFs) or hybrid architecture-based
methods like TEEs. Many proposals already exist for linking
identity and blockchain, e.g., [36], [50]. Most of these efforts
focus on permissionless blockchains; however, our concern has
been with those inter-organizational applications that already
rely on some business relationship. Part of Hyperledger’s
Fabric is its customizable membership services that allows the
permissioned blockchain and various access controls for both
data and chaincode. By default, Fabric itself already contains
the identity information in the form of traditional CAs and
PKI, but could easily be extended with roots of trust.
Intrusion Detection. Various methods of intrusion detection
exist, from simple identity authentication to behavioural anal-
ysis and anomaly detection mechanisms. With this data stored
within the blockchain, and accessible to network participants,
dynamic trust decisions can be made autonomously based
on heuristic algorithms and the preponderance of evidence.
Consider a network in which devices attest to their static and
dynamic execution, and anomalous behaviour is recorded by
neighboring devices. Allow an attacker to subvert some small
subset of devices that begin participating in a distributed denial
of service attack (DDOS) against other nodes in the network
or even remotely. Observation and attestation of this behaviour
by the rest of the network might quickly result in the isolation
of the compromised devices.
Post-event Forensic Audits. It is often challenging for an
average computer user, when presented with a vulnerability
disclosure, to effectively understand their risk on personal
devices. For example, even with the authors’ experience with
computer technology and security, understanding the personal
risk associated with the Heartbleed vulnerability was non-
trivial. At the scale of IoT deployments, even the best IT
professionals can be expected to struggle given the diversity
of devices, firmware, and software. While typical attestation
systems are ad hoc and transactional, including attestation
within a blockchain can potentially create a historical record,
within the ledger, of a device’s entire lifecycle. This allows
for not only managing software deployments (e.g., knowing
which version of OpenSSH is on what devices), but would
also allow forensic audits of a device’s history. Consider an
attestation system that utilizes DAN, that records identity,
deployed software and firmware, dynamic attestation, and
external behavioural analysis and anomaly detection. After a
vulnerability disclosure, it becomes not only easy to identify
potentially vulnerable devices, but also when they became
vulnerable, how long they have been vulnerable, and what—if
any—questionable actions they may have taken during that
time. In addition, a DAN’s flexibility with smart contracts
means that much of this might be automated.
Regulatory Certification. The cargo cult mindset of com-
puter security is not good. However, regulatory compliance
is a fact of life. The National Institute of Standards and
Technology are formulating what could be the beginning of
just such regulations [24]. In “Considerations for Managing
IoT Cybersecurity and Privacy Risks”, NIST considers three
goals: (1) device security, (2) data security, and (3) individual
privacy [13]. Asset, vulnerability, and access management are
listed as areas of risk mitigation. As seen above, DAN facil-
itates each of these areas, in addition to the areas of incident
detection and information flow management. Further, consider
the scenario in which regulators are participants within a DAN,
and able to verify desired principles and functionality based on
the verified self-reporting of the devices themselves. For exam-
ple, consider a piece of critical infrastructure equipment that
contains the necessary roots of trust and can attest to a DAN.
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It is plausible that regulators, security auditors, or liability
insurers might have certain criteria for security, e.g., hardware
with specific features enabled or “up-to-date” firmware and
software versions. These entities may be tasked with certifying
compliance; however, they may not have the expertise or
best knowledge to adequately make these determinations. The
hardware manufacturer knows best what capabilites a device
has. Firmware and software vendors (should) know best the
specifications of their products. Third-party security-related
groups might be more current on state-of-the-art vulnerabilties.
By allowing these external parties to validate the attestations
of a device, those in charge of compliance can certify that
those with best knowledge approve or disprove of a device.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we discuss implementation details and de-
scribe our work virtualizing, simulating, and creating a proof-
of-concept DAN.
We began with a virtualized simulation of a DAN using only
Docker containers. This was primarily to familiarize ourselves
with the Fabric framework, and to quickly experiment with
storing and retrieving attestation data. In this simulation, we
utilized one node for each producer, consumer, and validator.
Additionally, we relied on a single peer node for blockchain
interactions including membership services, transaction or-
dering and endorsement. In our initial implementation, we
followed the example challenge-response protocol shown in
Figure 2. Attestation and validation were triggered manually.
In this case, we did not rely on a trusted computing base
(TCB), but assumed the attestations reported were valid. For
attestation data, we simulated TPM quotes by generating
random measurement lists, and calculating hashes for “known
good” states. For these trials, we ignored PKI and signatures
on the attested data.
To extend this we built a practical testbed, implementing a
DAN using eight Raspberry Pi, models 2B and 3B+, as our
IoT nodes. The Pi has become synonymous with IoT research
and development. They are low-cost ($35), credit-card sized,
relatively powerful, and highly expandable. The model 2B has
a Broadcom BCM2837 system on a chip (SoC) with a 900
MHz Quad Core ARMv8-A Cortex-A53 cpu. The 3B+ sports
a slightly beefier Broadcom BCM2837B0 SoC with a 1.4 GHz
Quad Core ARMv8-A Cortex-A53 cpu, with the addition of
on-board WiFi and PoE. Both systems have 5V and 3.3V sup-
plies, and support 40 general-purpose input/output (GPIO) pins
with UART, I2C, SPI, and I2S functionality. This flexibility
has led to a large number of add-on boards and peripherals. To
provide our TCB, we used Infineon Optiga SLB 9670 TPM2.0
iridium boards that are TCG compliant and fully CC(EAL4+)
and FIPS certified. These boards communicate over SPI using
Infineon’s Embedded Linux TPM Toolbox 2 (ELTT2).
We setup two “organizations” each with 3 compute nodes
and a single gateway node. Recall Figure 1. Each organization
was assigned a blockchain peer that ran inside a Docker
container on a consumer laptop or desktop. The same protocol
transactions were tested for consistency. Our simulated attes-
tations were produced from random measurement lists that
were hashed into the TPM PCRs and read out again. Again,
for these trials we ignored PKI and signatures on the attested
data.
Producer nodes were scripted to “ping” consumers at regular
intervals. Attestations of the producer nodes were submitted
to the blockchain on a periodic basis. Additionally, random
groups of validators were chosen to verify attestations. We
tested several scenarios in which consumers required sin-
gle and multiple validators to sign off on attestation. Trust
decisions by consumers were made on varying aggregate
validations, e.g., certain consumers only trust specific val-
idators, or require multiple validations, or require more fresh
validation. On a failed validation, consumers would instantiate
an iptables firewall rule to DROP traffic from the abusing
producer. Manual triggers were used introduce potential errors
such as to interrupt or delay attestations from a producer, force
submit invalid attestations into the blockchain, or interrupt
validators from reading attestations or writing their results.
V. EVALUATION
Primary concerns for IoT attestation are the cryptographic
and blockchain operations on resource-constrained devices.
We consider the feasibility of the proof-of-concept attestation
scheme by analyzing the potential performance impacts of
computation, communication, storage, and energy overheads.
In our example DAN, the TPM must generate hashes over
static measurement lists. To isolate this computation, we
performed a comparison between SHA1 and SHA256 hashing
on various randomized payloads ranging from 1 to 100 bytes.
Each test was repeated 1000 times.
Computation Overhead: Naturally, the Infineon TPM re-
quires less CPU time, and is roughly twice as slow (in system
time) as the Raspberry Pi on any payload size. These results
are shown for both SHA1 and SHA256 in Figures 3 and 4. On
average, the wall-clock time to complete these tests required
54 seconds on the TPM, and only 17 seconds on the Pi. These
results were expected given the TPM’s 43Mhz transfer rate on
the SPI interface, and the relative power of the Raspberry Pi.
Communication Overhead: Communication within the
DAN is ad hoc. A proving device need only attest periodically
or when requested. Additionally, verifiers and consumers pri-
marily communicate with blockchain peers. In our conception,
these peers are somewhat more robust than the IoT devices
on the edge of the network. Thus, communication is primarily
limited by the throughput of the blockchain peers, as well
as the bandwidth and latency of the network. For our proof-
of-concept, these factors were neglibile; however, more testing
should be done to evaluate the scaling limits of a representative
network.
Storage Overhead: Because our proof-of-concept is simple
and relies on Raspberry Pi, storage is not a real concern. Each
entity within the network needs only the credentials to interact
with the blockchain peers. More advanced attestation schemes
may require more storage; however, proving devices need only
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Fig. 3. Timing of SHA1 hashing on Infineon TPM and Raspberry Pi 3B+.
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Fig. 4. Timing of SHA256 hashing on Infineon TPM and Raspberry Pi 3B+.
enough storage to generate attestation since all the protocol
data elements are stored within the blockchain on peer nodes.
Additionally, it is worth mentioning that by adding a physical
TPM, a device gains access to some additional non-volatile
RAM (NVRAM) (in the case of our Infineon TPM, 6962
bytes).
Energy Overhead: During the hashing experiments men-
tioned above, we also monitored the power usage with the
combination of a consumer-grade wall-outlet electricity usage
monitor and multimeter. The average power consumption for
SHA1 and SHA256 experiments are shown in Figures 5
and 6. While these measurements may lack resolution, their
relative comparison is instructive. On average, the Raspberry
Pi requires 10% more power than the TPM during hashing.
Additionally, at peak load, the Pi draws 5% more power
based on watt calculation. These results suggest that, even
though the TPM is powered by the Pi, when performing
these cryptographic operations the TPM is more efficient.
Further experiments are required to eliminate potential effects
of power supply inefficiency.
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Fig. 5. Average power consumption during SHA1 hashing on Infineon TPM
and Raspberry Pi 3B+.
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Fig. 6. Average power consumption during SHA256 hashing on Infineon
TPM and Raspberry Pi 3B+.
A. Qualitative Analysis
In building our proofs of concept, we learned several things.
We address some of these questions below.
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What are the necessary hardware requirements and are they
feasible given IoT resource constraints? In general, attestation
requires some root of trust. Hardware roots of trust typically
provide more robust security guarantees; although, they do
come with a price. However, given the TCG’s latest propos-
als, and the growing research interests in Trusted Execution
Environments, these hardware roots of trust will only become
more practical.
A major IoT constraint is often power, with many devices
relying on batteries. Adding a hardware root of trust, such as
the Infineon TPMs we used in our proof of concept represents
a design decision. While TPMs are relatively efficient, with
hardware implementations of things like SHA-1 and SHA-
256, they do represent an additional draw on a small device.
Using TEEs as a root of trust may be more efficient. In
the future, we’d like to compare the power draw during
common attestation and cryptographic operations between
our hardware TPMs and SGX or TrustZone. However, any
attestation represents additional overhead. For some applica-
tions, runtime attestation may be unnecessary. Attestation may
only be needed occasionally, with long (e.g., days) periods
between successive attempts. Hardware roots of trust will only
become more efficient and smaller over time. Alternatively,
some applications may only need the security guarantees of a
software-based attestation method.
Is this sort of network efficient given the general concerns
about proof-of-work blockchains? The Hyperledger Fabric that
we have utilized is modular and allows pluggable consensus
mechanisms. By default it runs Byzantine Fault Tolerance
(BFT) which is well-known, highly scalable, and efficient for
the permissioned environment that we consider.
Can the network nodes, as we’ve described them here,
support blockchain operations efficiently? In the proof of
concept that we built, blockchain operations are performed
by peer nodes within docker containers on consumer laptops
and desktops. In a real-world deployment, these may remain
containerized and be virtualized within the cloud. Alterna-
tively, there are current efforts to build so-called “light clients”
that may allow resource-constrained IoT devices to interact
individually with the blockchain as peers [51]. However,
storage will remain a problem. It may be feasible to move
blockchain storage to an intermediate device like a gateway
or base station, further into a data center, or even the cloud.
Does the blockchain scale with the theorized IoT deployment
numbers? It clearly depends on what information is being
included into the blockchain, by how many devices, and how
often. Naturally, we have concerns given the long running
estimation of IoT devices, and the desire to maintain a
complete lifecycle history. One potential mitigation for these
concerns is checkpointing [33]. Additionally, at least in the
case of the current generation of IoT devices, firmware and
software updates are few and far-between. When considering
dynamic attestation, there are efforts to increase efficiency by
only considering security critical sections of code. All of these
factors may help to reduce the overhead of blockchain storage
and computation.
What are the security concerns of offloading to base sta-
tion/gateway? Naturally, the communication between the more
anemic network nodes and the intermediate device needs to
be secure. Adding such a node within the network makes
for a great man-in-the-middle (MITM) target, and potentially
introduces a single point of failure that must be considered.
Additionally, attestation now relies on a hierarchy as the base
station must be attested trustworthy along with any down-
stream nodes.
VI. DISCUSSION
DAN is the first distributed attestation architecture that
utilizes blockchain as a principal component to facilitate
remote attestation. It provides flexibility in establishing a given
attestation protocol. It mirrors the envisioned topology of IoT
systems. And it naturally satisfies the five constraints of an
attestation system provided by Coker et al. [17]:
Measurement of diverse aspects of the target attestation.
DAN is not limited to a particular attestation method. Both
static, load-time measurements and dynamic runtime measure-
ments may be recorded within the blockchain.
Separation of domains for measurement. In the prototype
we built, we rely on hardware TPMs to facilitate our root of
trust. As discussed earlier, hardware mechanisms for trust are
evolving to satisfy the constraints of the IoT. Trust anchors
are transparent to DAN implementations.
Self-protecting trust base. The trusted base for an individual
device’s attestation may vary depending on services being
attested, or the requirements of the validator that is used.
Attestation delegation. The principles of DAN naturally
allow multiple verifiers or validators of attestation. In fact, it
is easily conceivable that different attestations may be verified
by multiple different validators. This creates the opportunity
for trust decisions based on a more comprehensive assessment
of a target device.
Attestation Manager. The blockchain can naturally realize
this concept by providing a distributed ledger containing all of
the measurement and attestation tools currently supported by
various devices. The DAN, as we have implemented it with
Hyperledger Fabric, can also enable the constrained disclosure
requirements by utilizing customized membership services and
standard PKI.
VII. RELATED WORK
In this section, we provide an overview of related prior
work. Attestation is a mature, and robust field of study. Our
design of a distributed attestation network utilizing blockchain
does not specify an attestation method or protocol. As such,
we focus on distributed attestation and IoT systems.
BIND [58] introduced granularity to attestation. The authors
describe a process of annotating programs to guide the attes-
tation of critical code sections, and then link that code to the
resulting data. DAN supports the idea of granularity by being
agnostic to what data is being attested.
Yang, Wang, Zhu, and Cao [70] consider the problem
of identifying compromised nodes within unattended sensor
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networks. They propose two distributed software-based al-
gorithms for detecting such compromise even when mul-
tiple compromised nodes collude during attestation. A key
assumption is made that every node within the network must
participate in attestation. The design and implementation of
DAN does not require this constraint. And indeed, it is a
constraint for IoT networks that may be heterogeneous, and in-
terdependent with respect to services. DAN allows attestation
between a single prover or many.
Chen and Wang [15] consider homogeneous wireless sensor
networks, and show optimal metrics for how often to attest and
how many neighbors to require. DAN allows both ad hoc and
periodic attestations and validations to be recorded into the
blockchain.
SEDA [12] and SANA [5] provide collective attestation
techniques for swarms. The network topology considered in
swarms requires that nodes only be able to communicate
with their direct neighbors. Our implementation of DAN does
not assume this constraint. In fact, DAN can be used to
facilitate all communication via the blockchain with requests
for attestation, and the subsequent results and verification all
published. Additionally, most swarm attestation techniques
result in each device within the swarm being attested, while
DAN could facilitate either single or multi-party attestation
and verification.
Fremantle et al. [26] proposed the use of blockchain for
IoT devices with a reliance on intermediate, more powerful
devices, termed pythia. The current implementation of DAN
similarly relies on intermediate devices to perform blockchain
operations; however, promising work is being done to create
light-clients that may make it feasible for resource-constrained
devices to communicate directly with the blockchain. For
DAN, the primary concern would be storage of the blockchain,
especially for long lived devices.
Liang et al. [44] use SGX-based remote attestation and
Hyperledger to build a secure membership services platform.
In contrast, DAN relies on a hardware root of trust; however,
software-based attestations are equally supported. DAN is
flexible enough to allow various roots of trust on edge devices.
Tan et al. [64] consider a multi-tier attestation protocol that
relies on more powerful devices with hardware TPMs, and
more anemic devices utilizing software roots of trust. Unlike
their work, we do not assume a single trusted device to issue
attestation challenges; instead, DAN is flexible, and allows a
variety of attesting relationships across multiple organizations.
WISE [6] is a flexible swarm attestation scheme that allows
subsets of devices to be attested based on the history or
characteristics of each device. An assumption for swarm
attestation is still that all devices be attested by each other.
While DAN could support this sort of attestation because
of the history already contained within the blockchain, it is
not necessary for any given transaction amongst various IoT
devices that every device in the network be attested.
CIoTA [28] is a framework for anomaly detection that relies
on blockchain. An anomaly detection model is attested to the
blockchain, and used to iteratively build a combined, dynamic
model that is distributed to each device. Our implementation
of DAN is more generalizable in that we are not focused
on anomaly detection, but encourage multiple and varied
attestation schemes in addition to our interests in asset and
identity management and forensic audits.
RADIS [18] is a protocol for distributed service attestation.
The authors rightly consider the cascading effect of compro-
mised dependent services and describe a method of attestation
in which attesting service 1 on device 2, may require attesting
service 2 on device 3. Our implementation of DAN could
facilitate this sort of cascading given the requisite attestation
of each device within the blockchain. Care must needs be
given to the implemented protocol to prevent time-of-check
to time-of-use (TOCTOU) vulnerabilities, race-conditions, and
circular dependencies.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we introduced DAN: a distributed attestation
network that utilizes blockchain technologies to decentralize,
and distribute attestation. DAN is the first attestation architec-
ture in which blockchain integrates directly with the attestation
protocol. DAN allows a variety of complex relationships to
exist between producers, consumers, and validators. Addi-
tionally, DAN is flexible enough to support a multitude of
validators using different attestation mechanisms at the same
time. By relying on the blockchain, new and interesting appli-
cations are possible, for example device lifecycle histories and
forensic audits. In the future, we plan to extend current state
of the art attestation protocols into DAN, and continue to use
our testbed for quantitative evaluation and feasibility testing,
such as comparing the power efficiency between hardware and
software roots of trust. The security of DAN is currently based
upon the assumption of guarantees provided by the underlying
hardware, protocols, and cryptographic infrastructure of the
blockchain. A more formal model of these primitives and
interactions is needed to prove the security and scalability of
IoT attestation.
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